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Abstract: 
 Xinjiang Province, the far western province of China, has noted an increase in domestic 
terrorism as a result Uighurs that are radicalized through feelings of religious and ethnic oppression. 
China is also not evenly implementing its laws on religious protections. This paper suggests a change 
in Beijing’s policy towards Xinjiang that promotes religious liberty for Uighur Muslims, which will 
be more conductive to Beijing’s ultimate goals for peace, stability, and unity in the region.  
 
injiang province is the westernmost 
province in China and shares a border 
with much of Central Asia. It is the home 
province of China’s Uighur population, the 
majority of which are Muslim, and is a province 
of strategic and economic interest to China 
because of the region’s immense natural wealth 
of resources - such as coal, natural gas, and rare 
metals - and position as a link to the rest of 
Asia.1 The region connects China to 
Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Russia, India, and even 
Afghanistan, which makes it a critical hub in 
China’s ‘New Silk Road’ plan. This economic 
plan would increase the flow of trade between 
China, other central Asian countries, and the 
Middle East, similar to the ancient Silk Road.  
However, despite an increased military 
presence, reshuffling of Chinese policy 
towards Xinjiang, and government investing, 
from radicalized Uighur Muslims who have 
begun making targeted terrorist strikes, the 
region has faced an increased number of 
terrorist attacks over the past several years.2 
Religious oppression and erasure of ethnic 
identity among Xinjiang’s Uighur Muslims has 
led to an increase in the radicalization and 
subsequent terrorist attacks. Adopting a policy 
of religious liberty and tolerance towards this 
                                                 
1 Katie Hunt, “Xinjiang Violence: Does China have a terrorist 
problem?” CNN, Last date modified: December 3, 2015. 
ethnic minority in Xinjiang will bring stability 
and unity that the Chinese central government 
is aiming for in the region, and will allow the 
government to better address other issues that 
contribute to tensions in Xinjiang, such as 
economic development. Extending religious 
freedoms to the Uighur Muslims will bring the 
stability that the Chinese government seeks in 
the region. 
 
A Brief History of Xinjiang 
Xinjiang, as a region, has been a part of 
numerous empires throughout history, even 
serving its own brief stint as an independent 
country from 1944-1949. It is home to the 
Uighur ethnic minority, where they constitute 
approximately ten million of a population of 
about twenty-two million, who are culturally 
and linguistically distinct from the rest of 
China. This has led to a sense of identity, 
critically constructed around their language, 
culture, and religion, that supersedes their 
Chinese national identity. The Uighur language 
is Turkic in origin, the culture is closer to 
Central Asian rather than East Asian/Chinese, 
and the people are ethnically distinct on a 
genomic level – closer to European than East 
2 William Wan, “5 questions on Xinjiang Separatists, Uighurs, 
and knife attacks at Chinese train station.” Washington Post, 
Last date modified: March 2, 2014. 
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Asian.3 The region has been a part of China 
since the 18th century as a result of Qing 
Dynasty expansion, pushing out the previous 
ruling empire.4 The region has since been 
administered by the Chinese government 
under the Qing dynasty, the Republic of China, 
and the People’s Republic of China, although 
the region has, throughout the change in 
administration, maintained the ethnic identity 
and resisted governance from Beijing.5  
During the political instability of the 
Chinese Revolution, rebels in Xinjiang, 
supported by surrounding countries and the 
Soviet Union, declared a brief period of 
independence and renamed the area East 
Turkestan in 1944. They had been driven by 
nationalism to attempt to establish an 
independent socialist Uighur-state, an ambition 
that the People’s Republic of China stifled 
when the region was brought back underneath 
Chinese rule in 1949. However, while large, 
powerful, and organized voices for Uighur 
independence were shut down following the 
reunification, nationalistic sentiment persists to 
today. Under leader Mao Zedong, China 
utilized a policy of pluralism and cultural 
tolerance which kept cohesion and stability in 
Xinjiang, with some peaceful protests breaking 
out intermittently, and the Chinese Communist 
Party “between the mid-1980s and 1996[…] 
attained a grudging tolerance for its Xinjiang 
policies by a significant portion of the Uighur 
elites.”6 This is because the party allowed the 
Uighurs to maintain their own language and 
practice their religion with limited interference. 
The mid-1990s saw a change of China’s 
Xinjiang policy, towards the ‘Strike Hard’ 
                                                 
3 Shuhua Xu and Jin Li, “A Genome-Wide Analysis of 
Admixture in Uyghurs and a High-Density Admixture Map 
for Disease-Gene Discovery.” American Journal of Human 
Genetics 83.3 (2008): 322–336. PMC. 
4 James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang, 
Columbia University Press. 98 
5 Arienne M. Dwyer, “Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, 
Language Policy, and Political Discourse”, East-West Center, 
Policy Studies 15. 91.  
policy and a rollback on linguistic pluralism in 
the region. Since then, the Uighur population 
has seen the government begin to implement a 
policy promoting mono-culturalism and 
mono-lingualism in Xinjiang by repressing 
Islam and Uighur language instruction.7 
Subsequently, the Chinese government has 
begun to take action against the growing 
unrest, an increase in riots, and terrorist attacks 
in the region. However, the heavy handed 
response has adversely affected peaceful 
Uighurs who do not participate in the protests 
or violent altercations. 
 
The Current Issue 
Lately, China has seen an increasing trend 
among terrorist attacks executed by radicalized 
Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang province. They are 
fueled by curtailing of religious rights, rollback 
of Uighur-language instruction in schools, and 
perceptions that the ethnic group is being 
discriminated against by not only the 
government, but also the Han Chinese that are 
moving into the region. CNN notes that:  
 
Uyghur exile groups and human 
rights activists say repressive 
religious policies and economic 
marginalization have provoked much 
of the recent unrest. They add the 
education system undermines use of 
the Uyghur language.8 
 
Religious oppression, cultural erosion, and 
economic disparity are leading to radicalization 
among China’s Uighur ethnic group in 
Xinjiang.9 Economic development in the 
6 Dwyer 63 
7 Dwyer 63 
8 Hunt. “Xinjiang Violence: Does China have a terrorist 
problem?” 
9 Tong Zhao, "Social Cohesion and Islamic Radicalization: 
Implications from the Uighur Insurgency," Journal of Strategic 
Security 3, 3, 40. 
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region has disproportionately benefitted larger 
corporations and increased the wealth gap, 
particularly between the Uighurs and Han 
Chinese.10 Beyond that, migrant workers and 
the Han Chinese immigration that has 
constantly increased in recent years have led to 
the feeling among Uighurs that they are being 
marginalized in their own province.11 The 
current political climate has seen targeted 
terrorist attacks committed by radicalized 
Uighur Muslims increase in recent years, a 
break from historical academic and peaceful 
protests. Such attacks have taken place in 
Kunming and Beijing. The global political 
climate has also contributed to the tensions, 
though not as much as domestic issues, with 
imported militant Islam radicalizing some 
Uighurs and leading them to join Daesh and to 
fight for the Taliban in Afghanistan. Daesh is 
the terrorist organization operating in Iraq and 
Syria otherwise known as ISIS or ISIL.12 As 
Xinjiang becomes increasingly unstable with 
unrest and protests, the government increases 
the heavy-handedness of its response. This 
response is in-line with the ‘Strike Hard’ policy 
towards Xinjiang, which simply feeds back into 
the problem. 
 
Current Chinese Policy 
On a holistic level, the Chinese 
government has a policy that promotes mono-
lingualism and mono-culturalism among its 
ethnic groups in an effort to promote national 
unity with China and a singular Chinese 
identity. In pursuit of this, local dialect 
instruction is scaled back in favor of teaching 
Mandarin in schools, and integration with Han 
                                                 
10 Shannon Tiezzi, “China Doubles Down on Economic 
Development in Troubled Xinjiang,” The Diplomat, Last date 
modified: May 7, 2014.  
11 Zhao 44 
12 Jack Moore, “Xinjiang's Uighur Muslims Receiving 
'Terrorist Training' From Isis Fighters for Attacks in China”, 
International Business Times, Last Date modified: September 22, 
2014. 
ethnicity is actively promoted. This is the 
unofficial policy of China, while the on-paper 
policy is egalitarian and accommodationist.13 
This split policy – unofficial and official – can 
be seen in Tibet in regard to its culture and 
language as well.  In 2014, Chinese President 
Xi Jinping discussed a revitalized Xinjiang 
policy that would have three main elements: 
“Fighting terrorism with an iron hand, 
implementing development to benefit the 
common people, and strengthening military 
presence in the region.“14 This is not a new 
policy and has been implemented for years, but 
only refers to Xinjiang as a whole rather than 
addressing the plights of the Uighur minority 
in any meaningful capacity. Currently, the 
Chinese government and state media 
characterize any sort of Xinjiang independence 
protest as terrorist in nature, be it peaceful or 
not.15 Separatist elements within the region are 
subject to either harsh prison sentences or 
execution, and even academics not in the 
region are subject to harsh punishments and 
sentencing. In 2014, Illham Tohti, an Uighur 
academic who taught at Minzu University in 
Beijing, was accused of fermenting separatist 
sentiments in Xinjiang and was sentenced to 
life in prison, despite his peaceful and academic 
approach to discussing ‘the Xinjiang issue’. He 
had discussed the issue in his classes at Minzu 
University, hosted an online forum for 
discussion, and promoted brainstorming for 
answers. His family’s assets were frozen 
despite the fact that his wife and two young 
sons relied on those savings.16   
The state is also heavily involved in the way 
that Muslims practice their religion in the 
13 Dwyer 2 
14 Tiezzi “China Doubles Down on Economic Development 
in Xinjiang,” 
15 David Volodzko, “China’s Own Double Standard on 
Terrorism.” The Diplomat. Last Date modified: November 23, 
2015.  
16Edward Wong. “China Sentences Uighur Scholar to Life.” 
New York Times. Last date modified: September 23, 2014.  
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region, through the means of state-approved 
Qurans, state controlled mosques, and laws 
against certain displays of religion.17 Muslims 
living in certain areas of Xinjiang or hold 
government positions, they may not have their 
traditional beards and there are restrictions on 
the hijab and burka. These restrictions have 
been enforced under the idea that they disrupt 
the public order, and current Chinese religious 
policy upholds that “[displays of religion] 
should not be used as tools to disrupt the 
public.”18 In an effort to ensure that religion is 
prevented from being used in ways that may 
disrupt the public, the government controls 
religious bodies and organization through the 
administration of the registration of religious 
bodies such as church groups and religious 
societies.19 China does allow for mosques to be 
built and for individuals to practice their 
religion without interference, but the state has 
power over organized religion. The exact 
language of China’s policy towards religious 
protections can be found in article 36 of their 
constitution, which states: 
 
No State organ, public organization 
or individual may compel citizens to 
believe in, or not to believe in, any 
religion; nor may they discriminate 
against citizens who believe in, or do 
not believe in, any religion. The State 
protects normal religious activities. 
No one may make use of religion to 
engage in activities that disrupt 
public order, impair the health of 
citizens or interfere with the 
educational system of the State.20 
 
                                                 
17 Wan “5 questions on Xinjiang Separatists, Uighurs, and 
knife attacks at Chinese train station.” 
18 Ping Xiong, “Freedom of Religion in China Under the 
Current Legal Framework and Foreign Religious Bodies,” 
Brigham Young University Law Review, vol. 2013, issue 3, 610. 
19 Xiong 610. 
The wording in the constitution suggests that 
all religions in China are protected, but the 
policy is not implemented evenly, as seen in the 
previous examples of government intervention 
in the growing of beards and wearing of certain 
religious clothing. 
The government has also taken the stance 
that the key to stability in the region lies in the 
economic development of Xinjiang and 
providing income development and social 
mobility to the Uighur population.21 To this 
end, the government has put Xinjiang at the 
center of one of the most important economic 
development policies that it has crafted, the 
‘New Silk Road’ development project, which is 
intended to bring a large amount of trade and 
financial assets through the region. The use of 
military force in accordance with the ‘Strike 
Hard’ policy is also utilized by the local and 
central government, and the option of 
increasing military and police presence is 
always a possibility for those in power. 
Collectively, all of these policies aim towards 
fighting the ‘three evils’ that China faces in 
Xinjiang: violent terrorism, ethnic separatism, 
and religious extremism.22  
 
Evaluation of Current Chinese Policy 
On a macro-level, the current Chinese 
policy towards Xinjiang has failed in its goals 
and has only led to further development of the 
issues. The radicalization of Uighurs especially 
revolves around two particular aspects that are 
the result of Chinese policy: the oppression of 
religious rights and the loss of language. 
Dwyer, a professor of Linguistic Anthropology 
at the University of Kansas, summed up the 
situation: 
 
20 Xiong 605 
21 Tiezzi “China Doubles Down on Economic Development 
in Xinjiang,” 
22 Julia Famularo, “Chinese Religious Regulations in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region: A Veilled Threat to 
Turkic Muslims?” Project 2024, 2015.   
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In targeting these core markers of 
Uyghur culture, previously 
slumbering sensitivities were 
inflamed. For language and religion 
are valued by most ordinary Uyghurs 
as central aspects of their identity. As 
both are considered inviolable and 
semi-private, significant 
encroachment by a dominant 
Chinese culture is perceived as an 
attack on identity.23 
 
The promotion of Mandarin instruction and 
religious oppression have only fostered 
resistance among the Uighurs and pushed 
them towards radicalization, as they believe it 
to be the only option left to express their 
religion and culture, given that their peaceful 
protest attempts have been suppressed. This is 
a particularly dangerous situation when the 
global political climate is facing jihad from 
extremists in the Middle East, which has drawn 
some of these elements out of Xinjiang to Iraq, 
Syria, and Afghanistan. While the region has 
seen economic development from government 
investment and the development of the New 
Silk Road, it has been imbalanced and the 
groups that would benefit the most from it 
have not been positively affected. In this 
regard, the government investment has only 
exacerbated the income inequality and driven 
the Uighur population to desperate measures. 
The Chinese government, in its attempts to 
bring Xinjiang closer to China and foster a 
Chinese identity among the Uighurs, has only 
pushed the region’s ethnic minority further 
away. A key example of this is seen with the 
government changing Kashgar, which was a 
hub of Uighur culture, into a special economic 
zone in an attempt to bring greater prosperity 
                                                 
23 Dwyer 63 
24 Colin Mackerras, “Xinjiang in China’s Foreign Relations: 
Part of a New Silk Road Plan or Central Asian Zone of 
Conflict?” East Asia vol. 32, issue 1. 28. 
to Uighurs. Instead, the economic change 
destroyed “not only old buildings, but 
communities and traditions as well.”24 
 
Suggestion for New Policy 
The policy suggested in this paper follows 
the concept of ‘winning the hearts and minds 
of the people’. This is a concept in the theory 
of war, where rather than attempting to resolve 
a conflict through the use of superior military 
force, an actor instead uses intellectual and 
emotional connections to rally the people 
behind a certain cause. This policy promotes 
the ultimate goal of defeating the opposite 
force in the theater of public opinion, 
operating on the premise that if the people do 
not support your endeavor, then victory is 
unattainable and the situation will ultimately 
result in favor of the other side.25 The Chinese 
government should move back to a policy 
similar to the one under Deng Xiaoping, as the 
Uighur public was more receptive to those 
policies than they are to current ones.  
As it stands, the Uighur population in 
Xinjiang believe themselves to be mitigated, 
discriminated, and oppressed in their own 
home province, and the central Chinese 
government has recognized that there is 
evidence that leads the population to come to 
these conclusions. One large contributing 
factor to this perception of oppression among 
the Uighur population is the current religious 
policy, explored previously. This paper puts 
forward a policy of religious tolerance and 
religious liberty for Xinjiang’s ethnic Uighur 
population by implementing the actual 
wording of the religious protections in the 
Chinese constitution. This language of 
religious protection must be equally enforced 
in Xinjiang. Currently, the Uighurs are seeing 
25  Adrian Lewis, American Culture of War (Lawrence: The 
University of Kansas), 2013. 
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their religion repressed more strongly than 
others. By enforcing the religious protections 
guaranteed in the constitution, Xinjiang will see 
the religious liberty that the Uighurs are largely 
clamoring for. This liberty would allow the 
Uighurs, who practice a form of moderate 
Islam, to follow the demands of Islam, observe 
religious practices, and celebrate religious 
holidays. Given that one of the main issues 
between the Uighurs and the Chinese 
government is religious expression, this policy 
will ease those tensions. Furthermore, this 
policy aims at utilizing religious freedoms to 
diminish the rate of radicalization among 
Uighurs by allowing them to pursue their 
religion, turning them away from roads to 
radicalization and feelings of isolation and 
martyrdom. Beyond this allowance of worship, 
this will allow the Uighurs to maintain a sense 
of cultural and personal identity while 
improving their relationship with the central 
government in Beijing. This safe expression of 
religion coupled with sufficient cultural 
autonomy will prevent imported militant Islam 
in the area from taking hold.26 
With the mitigation of the threat of further 
radicalization and subsequent terrorist attacks 
from Uighurs, the Chinese government can 
then focus on addressing economic 
development within the region, addressing the 
economic disparity between the local 
population and the eight million Han Chinese 
who have immigrated to Xinjiang. Beyond this, 
the government will also be able to explore the 
issue as to how the revenue from the economic 
development in Xinjiang has largely gone to 
larger corporations, rather than the smaller 
businesses, which exacerbate the economic 
difficulties that the ethnic minorities face in the 
region. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                 
26 Dwyer 3 
In recent history, it has become evident 
how policies similar to China’s ‘Strike Hard’ 
policy towards terrorism ultimately do nothing 
but exacerbate the problem. Two critical 
examples can be seen with the United States 
during the Vietnam War and again during the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. During both 
wars, the United States failed at effectively 
winning the ‘hearts and minds of the people,’ 
pushing more civilians towards joining the 
enemy and communism. The United States 
failed at undercutting the actual reasons for 
civilians joining the Viet Cong and Al-Qaeda, 
and China is currently following a similar path 
in regards to the Uighurs. As China continues 
to constrict Xinjiang religious liberty, language, 
and identity, the Uighur population will grow 
increasingly desperate and the terrorist strikes 
will continue in the current upward trend.  
The policy in this paper would bring 
religious tolerance to Xinjiang, allowing the 
Uighur minority to maintain their religion, and 
by extension their language and identity. This 
will undercut the biggest reasons for 
radicalization and protest among Uighurs, and 
allow the Chinese government to focus less on 
military presence in the region. Some of the 
military’s actions attract international criticism 
for the degree of force that the government 
responds with. A change in policy will allow 
China to focus more on economic 
development of the region in preparation for 
the New Silk Road and the general 
improvement of the ethnic minorities and Han 
population that are in the region. The Chinese 
government could do this by promoting 
trustworthy local Uighur Communist Party 
officials to positions of power, so that the 
Uighur population sees itself as being 
represented in the government. The 
government could also use the same precedent 
of giving special rights to certain minorities in 
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order to justify extending religious liberty and 
language opportunity to the Uighurs. These 
actions would boost the stability in Xinjiang in 
ways beneficial to the government, and bring 
the country closer to national unity that Beijing 
pursues. 
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